Confirmation of Payee is the name-checking service behind most UK bank payments, and it is one of the first tools conveyancers reach for before completion funds move. This guide explains what the check does, where it happens, what the result tells you, and why a CoP check on its own is not enough to protect a completion payment.

It is written for conveyancers, so the language is practical and the conclusions are stated directly. If you are not sure whether your bank offers the check, what a partial match means, or how to record the result on the matter file, this is the guide for you.

What is Confirmation of Payee?

Confirmation of Payee, usually shortened to CoP, is the UK name-checking service operated by Pay.UK on behalf of participating banks. Before a payment is sent, the service checks the account name you have provided against the name held on the receiving account.

The service was introduced to help fight authorised push payment (APP) fraud: the family of frauds where the victim is tricked into authorising a payment to an account controlled by a fraudster. Payment diversion in conveyancing is a textbook example. The buyer authorises the transfer, and the funds go to an account the fraudster controls.

How the check works

You enter the payee name, sort code, and account number on your payment instruction.
Your bank, the sending bank, sends the details through the shared service to the receiving bank.
The receiving bank compares the name on the payment instruction against the name held on the account.
The service returns a result: match, no match, or partial match.

Three things follow. The check compares the name you typed against the account held at the receiving bank. It runs at the moment of payment. And it is best effort, not a guarantee.

The limits of the service

CoP does not cover every bank, and not every account at the banks it does cover. Some accounts may not be enrolled in the service, and in those cases the bank may not be able to give you a definitive result. If the bank returns anything other than a clear match, treat it as a hold and resolve it before funds move.

Where does the CoP check happen?

The check happens at the sending bank, at the point of payment. This is the detail that most often confuses the conversation about CoP in conveyancing.

The receiving bank does not verify the name when the account is opened. The verification is triggered by your payment instruction. The name you give at payment time is the name that gets compared against the account. That means CoP only protects payments that pass through a bank participating in the service, and it only protects the payment you instruct.

CoP applies to the payment systems that participate in the service, which is how most completion money moves. If either bank in the chain is not enrolled, or the payment method does not carry the check, you do not get the benefit of the name check at all.

What do match, no match and partial match mean?

Match

The name you supplied matches the name held on the account. That is all the result tells you: the sort code and account number you are paying are associated with the name you supplied. It does not tell you that the account belongs to the legitimate party, that the instruction was not diverted, or that the person who gave you the details is entitled to the funds.

No match

The name does not match the name held on the account. Treat this as a stop on the payment. The cause could be a simple typing error, an account that has changed hands, a details change that has not been communicated, or an account controlled by a fraudster. None of these can be distinguished by the check itself, and none of them is safe to assume away. Before completion funds move, a no match must be resolved with the account holder and recorded.

Partial match

The name is close but not identical. The account may belong to the intended payee, for example where the account is registered under a trading name, a shortened name, or a name that differs by a middle name or a title. It may equally belong to someone else. A partial match is not a reason to proceed and not a reason to panic. It is a reason to confirm the details with the account holder directly, on a known, verified number, and to record the confirmation.

The common thread across all three results is the same: CoP tells you what the name on the account is, at the moment of payment. It does not tell you whether that account is the account you intended to pay.

Why is CoP not enough for conveyancers?

CoP is a genuine control, and it catches real errors: mis-typed account numbers, accounts registered in the wrong name, and payment instructions built on stale details. But for the specific fraud that most worries conveyancers, payment diversion, the check has a structural blind spot.

Payment diversion works in the instruction chain, before the payment. A fraudster changes the bank details in an email, and the account number travels through the chain without anyone re-checking it. CoP runs at the payment moment. It compares the name on the instruction to the name on the account. If the fraudster controls an account registered in the seller's name, or a plausible variant of it, the check can return a match even though the instruction was diverted.

To put it plainly: CoP verifies the account details you have been given against the bank's records. It does not verify the details you have been given against the person you intend to pay.

The check also has three wider limits that matter for a completion payment:

It does not review documents. The check is blind to the paperwork behind the transaction, the source of funds, or the identity documents on the file.
It does not review people. CoP cannot tell you whether the person instructing the payment is the legitimate client, or whether an identity document has been fabricated.
It is best effort. It does not cover every bank or every account, and a definitive result is not always available.

That is why a CoP result, by itself, is not a verification step you can point to at the end of a matter. It is a transaction detail. The firms that defend against diversion run it as part of a wider set of checks, and they record the result alongside the checks that cover the documents, the people, and the instruction chain.

How to add a documented verification step before completion

CoP becomes part of a real control when it is run deliberately, at the right time, and recorded. Here is a practical sequence a conveyancer can follow before completion funds move:

Verify the receiving account against the party you intend to pay. The question is not "does this name match the account" but "is this the account the seller intends to receive the money". CoP answers the first. The confirmation call answers the second.
Run the CoP check at the sending bank before the funds move. Note the date, the time, the exact details checked, and the result. Record the result against the instruction that produced the details, so the file shows which set of account details was verified.
Confirm the bank details with the account holder by voice. Call on a known, verified number, ask for the sort code and account number in the account holder's own words, and record the call. This closes the diverted-instruction route that CoP cannot see.
Treat any result other than a clear match as a hold. A no match or partial match means the payment does not move until the discrepancy is explained and recorded.
Apply the checks to every matter, without exception. Verification works as a policy, not as a favour the fee earner remembers on a difficult day. A change of bank details, an unusual payment, or a time-pressured request should trigger the full sequence automatically.
Produce an artefact for the matter file. A signed verification report records what was checked, when, and how, and it can be independently verified by anyone with the public link. That record is what a lender, an insurer, or an auditor can look at.

Every step is one a fee earner can take this week, on a single matter, without new software or new training.

What does a signed report add to the matter file?

A CoP result on its own is a line in a bank statement. A signed verification report is a different kind of record. It states what was checked, when it was checked, and what the outcome was, and it carries a public link that anyone can check against the published signing key.

The difference matters in practice. Two firms can run exactly the same checks and end up in different positions if a dispute lands. The firm with a report can point to a document that a colleague, a lender, or a court can independently verify. The firm without one can only describe what it believes happened. That distinction is the difference between having a control and being able to prove you had one.

One caveat, stated plainly: a signed report does not make a transaction safe. It records the checks that were run and the results they produced. It is not a guarantee, and no check should be described as one.

CoP as one part of a wider check

Confirmation of Payee is worth using on every completion payment, and it is worth recording every time. It catches mistakes, it deters casual attempts to move money to a wrong-named account, and it is a visible, defensible control.

But the payment diversion attack is built before the payment is ever instructed. The name check at the moment of payment cannot see the email that changed the details, the identity that fabricated the document, or the phone call that never happened. That is why the firms that defend best run CoP alongside three other checks: document forensics, identity and media screening, and the recorded confirmation call. Together they cover the account, the documents, the people, and the confirmation. Each one on its own leaves a gap.

Immutis runs all four checks and produces one signed verification report per matter, with a public verify link that anyone can check. You can run it on a single matter or on every matter in the firm, and the report sits on the file ready for your lender, your insurer, and your audit.

Confirmation of Payee is a useful first line, but it is not the whole defence. Read our full guide to payment diversion fraud in conveyancing and how to stop it to see how the attack works and how the four checks fit together.